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Regional trade agreements among developing countries are understudied in  the literature. 
The Greater-Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA) is one such agreement among the Arab 
countries. The few existing studies on GAFTA suffer from many shortcomings that we 
address in this study. We incorporate the latest advances in the literature to investigate the 
partial and general equilibrium effects of GAFTA. The partial equilibrium estimates 
suggest that GAFTA had a positive and significant effect on bilateral trade of around 40% 
in 1998 and 61% seven years later after the phasing out of tariffs. The general equilibrium 
analysis suggests that the welfare effects of the agreement are very small and mostly 
negligible in the member states. The results highlight that deeper integration among the 
Arab countries is imperative to bring about further welfare benefits to the member states. 
This result can be generalized to recommend deeper regional trade agreements among 
developing countries to capitalize on the benefits of free trade. 
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1 In tro du ctio n  
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have grown in number over the past three decades, from only 33 in  
1992 to 306 in 2020 (WTO). At the same time, while RTAs among developing countries have become 
more common, they remain largely understudied compared to RTAs in which developed countries are 
involved 1. The Greater-Arab Free Trade Agreement (henceforth GAFTA) is one such agreement 
between the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)2. Many political and economic 
commentators consider GAFTA as an important first step to much-needed regional economic 
integration in the MENA region. GAFTA was first concluded by fourteen Arab countries in 1997 with 
the goal of eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) between the member states (Abedini and 
Péridy 2008, 849)3. The agreement went into force in 1998 and originally, the member states agreed  
to eliminate tariffs by 2007 but later  moved th is forward to 2005. Nonetheless, GAFTA remains a 
rather shallow agreement. According to data reported in the World Bank Deep Trade Agreements 
Database, GAFTA is one of the shallowest free trade agreements ever signed. Out of the fifty-two 
provisions notified at the WTO, GAFTA has only two4. Compare this with twenty-two provisions 
registered for The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) –  replaced by the United States–
Mexico– Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2020 - and seventeen for Mercosur (South America’s largest 
RTA). Another observation is that GAFTA only covers the trade in goods and does not extend to 
services. In addition, GAFTA lacks provisions on dispute settlement, competition laws, and 
harmonization of standards, all of which hamper deeper integration (Romagnoli and Mengoni 2009). 
This is likely to be the reason why intra-Arab trade as a share of total trade remains extremely low 
in this block of countries. Figure 1 shows that the share of intra-Arab trade in  total trade remains well 
below 10% even after GAFTA was signed. In fact, GAFTA does not seem to have any noticeable effect 
on this share. In comparison, Figure 1 shows that intra-NAFTA and intra-EU trades are 25% and 45% 
of total trade of the NAFTA and EU countries respectively in 2016. 
Further trade liberalization attempts in the MENA region have since been very modest. The GCC 
(Gulf Cooperation Council) countries formed a customs union in 2003. Furthermore, four members of 
GAFTA - Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and J ordan - signed the Agadir Agreement, which went into force in 
2007 and aimed at accelerating a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area 5. Further attempts to form a 
customs union among GAFTA members have stalled following the Arab Spring and other geo-political 
                                                            
1 The NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), for example, is the most studied RTA in the literature. 
2 This agreement is sometimes called the Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement (PAFTA) 
3 The original member signatories are Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates. 
4 The two provisions are tariff liberalization on industrial goods and tariff liberalization on agricultural goods. This 
is based on the author’s own reflection of the data. 
5 This is because the EU allows its Mediterranean trade partners to add up value-added in their exports and turns 
a blind eye to where value is added. No sooner has this agreement been signed than it was suspended when Morocco 






Figure 1. Share of intra-trade in total trade for the GAFTA, NAFTA, and the EU. Author’s own 
calculations based on trade data from the World Trade Flows database. 
 
Deeper economic integration among the MENA countries is similarly hampered by the lack of 
progress in the reduction of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). While tariffs may have been reduced to zero, there 
is little evidence that other red tape restrictions have been addressed. Hoekman and Zarrouk (2009) report 
in a firm-level survey in nine Arab countries conducted post-GAFTA that while tariffs have been removed, 
constraints related to red-tape and transport frictions are still very high. Péridy and Ghoneim (2013) 
estimate that the average tariff equivalents of NTBs in the MENA countries are still significant post- 
GAFTA. 
Given that GAFTA is a shallow agreement and that further integration in the region has largely 
failed, it is important that the effects of GAFTA be studied to highlight what GAFTA has accomplished 
for the member states in terms of trade and welfare. This is especially the case since the few existing 
studies on GAFTA suffer from shortcomings that have come to light with recent advances in the 
literature. GAFTA is also an example of a RTA among developing countries, which have been 
understudied in the literature. Hence, this study investigates the partial equilibrium (PE) and 
general equilibrium (GE) effects of GAFTA. This is the first comprehensive study that looks at both 
the PE and GE effects of GAFTA since its inception. In investigating the PE effects, this study 
addresses shortcomings in the existing empirical studies, to be highlighted below. Furthermore, this 
study is the only study that explores the GE effects of GAFTA ex-post and in all fourteen countries 
that originally signed the GAFTA. This is also the only study that looks at the effects of GAFTA at the 
time of enforcement and seven years later since tariffs were phased out over seven years. The results 
suggest that GAFTA had a large positive and significant effect on bilateral trade flows between the 
GAFTA members relative to other country pairs. We estimate that GAFTA leads to an increase in the 
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members’ bilateral trade of around 40% in 1998 and 61% seven years later. With respect to the GE 
effects, GAFTA has negligible effects. The highest welfare effects are calculated for J ordan and Oman 
where real wages increase by 0 .22 and 0 .24% respectively by 2005. 
The literature on GAFTA is generally thin. The few existing studies that investigate the PE effects 
of GAFTA ex-post use the gravity model as a framework. These studies suffer from shortcomings 
brought to light by recent advances in the literature. These shortcomings lead to biased estimates and 
prevent us from reaching reliable and conclusive results about the true effects of GAFTA. The 
shortcomings include ignoring internal trade flows, failing to control for multilateral resistances and 
not considering endogeneity. Recently, the literature has pointed out that including internal trade in the 
gravity equation estimations is consistent with the theoretical foundations of the gravity model and 
produces more precise estimates (Dai, Yotov, and Zylkin 2014, 322; Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin 2019, 
208; Vaillant, Flores, and Esteban Moncarz 2020). This is because any effects in international trade 
come at the expense of internal trade. In addition, the literature has highlighted the need to control for 
multilateral resistances that result from the same theoretical foundations (Anderson and Wincoop 
2003). Failing to do so produces biased estimated and is coined the ’gold medal mistake’ by Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2007)6.  The best way to control for multilateral resistances is to include exporter-time and 
importer-time fixed effects (Yotov et al. 2016, 19). Finally, while not new, the issue of endogeneity of 
RTAs is a serious issue that the literature has addressed. Including (directional) bilateral fixed effects 
addresses the problem to the extent that RTAs are correlated with time-invariant and unobserved 
bilateral factors. In addition, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest including a lead term of the RTA and 
estimating an insignificant coefficient of this term as a way to check for the exogeneity of the RTA. 
Alternatively, Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin (2019, 209) add an interaction between a dummy for international 
trade flows and time to capture globalization trends whereas Bergstrand, Larch, and Yotov (2015, 311) 
suggest including dyadic-time trends to test for strict exogeneity. This paper will address these 
shortcomings to arrive at more precise estimates than previous studies. We also improve on previous 
studies by using the PPML (pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood) estimator proposed by Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006). The PPML estimator has emerged as the preferred estimator in gravity equations 
because it accounts for non-linearity and heteroscedasticity in the data as well as zero trade flows (Yotov 
et al. 2016, 25). Concerning the GE effects, this study takes advantage of recent contributions that 
permit estimating the GE effects of RTAs from bilateral trade flows. The method followed in this study 
is based on estimating the effects of a policy variable (such as RTAs) in a baseline versus a 
counterfactual scenario using the combined properties of structural gravity and the non-linear 
                                                            
6 A simple way to conceptualize multilateral resistances would be to consider two countries that trade with 
each other. These two countries will trade more with each other if their trade with the rest of the world becomes 
more costly relative to their bilateral trade costs. 
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estimator PPML. The method was first proposed by Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015) and further 
developed in Yotov et al. (2016) and Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin (2019). 
One of the first studies that explore the PE effects of GAFTA ex-post is Abedini and Peridy (2008). 
The authors employ a gravity equation and a host of estimators and find that GAFTA has a positive 
effect on the members’ bilateral trade in the magnitude of 16-24% depending on the estimator. The 
main drawback of the study is not controlling for multilateral resistances (gold medal mistake) which, 
we know by now, produces biased estimates. Abdmoulah (2011) estimates cross-sectional regressions 
for 1997 and 2008 using a zero-inflated negative binomial model. The study finds some support for a 
positive and significant average effect of GAFTA of around 35% in 2008 only. Limitations of this study 
include the fact that the GAFTA went into force in 1998 and therefore, an estimation of the effect in 
1997 may not be appropriate. In addition, using cross-sectional data does not take advantage of the 
panel nature of trade data and the interpretation is no longer ex-post. Furthermore, the study does not 
control for multilateral resistances or bilateral non-observable factors and does not address 
endogeneity. Yigezu et al. (2013) estimate country regressions to capture the effects of GAFTA on 
agricultural trade only in member states and find mixed results depending on the country. This study 
suffers from the same limitations as the previous study. Another strand of the literature investigates the 
general equilibrium (GE) effects of GAFTA using a CGE (computable general equilibrium) model. 
Konan (2003) is the only other study - as far as I am aware - that employs a CGE framework to estimate 
the GE effects of a pure GAFTA scenario (among other scenarios) for Egypt and Tunisia only and does 
so ex-ante. The author finds that a pure GAFTA agreement would have a small negative welfare effect 
for Tunisia and a modest positive welfare effect for Egypt 7. 
Moreover, this study is related to the large literature on the effects of RTAs. Lessons learned 
from this literature generally support the hypothesis that RTAs have a positive average effect on 
bilateral trade flows of their members (see e.g. Baier and Bergstrand 2007 and Bergstrand, Larch, and 
Yotov 2015). Freund and Ornelas (2010) review this literature. Recently, however, the literature has 
highlighted that RTAs have widely heterogeneous effects. Kohl (2014) and Kohl et al. (2016) demonstrate 
that the depth of the agreement matters for the materialization of the RTA effects. Baier, Yotov, and 
Zylkin (2019) show the wide variation of the effects across 65 trade agreements. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the PE estimations of GAFTA. 
Section 3 performs the GE analysis and presents the results. Section 4 presents the concluding remarks. 
 
                                                            
7 Brown et al. (1996) use a CGE model for Tunisia to study the GE effects of the RTA between Tunisia and the 
EU in 1995 and find that the welfare effects range from negative to small positive depending on capital 
movements assumptions. Maskus and Konan (1997) find a similar result for Egypt in its trade with the EU. 
Rutherford et al. (2000) perform a counterfactual exercise in a CGE model and show that removing all import 
tariffs for imports from the EU by a representative Arab Mediterranean country would result in welfare gains of 
0.1 to 1.6%. 
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2  Partial e qu ilibrium  e ffe cts  o f GAFTA 
 
Following the literature, this study will use the gravity framework to estimate the PE effects of GAFTA. 
The literature has dealt extensively with the origins and foundations of the gravity model (see e.g. 
Anderson 2011 and De Benedictis and Taglioni 2011). Recall that we are interested in estimating the 
effects of GAFTA ex-post. The GAFTA effect will be captured with a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one for country-pairs that have signed up to the GAFTA, which went into force in 1998. As 
discussed above, we include in our estimations exporter- and importer-year fixed effects to control for 
multilateral resistances and country pair fixed effects to capture observable (such as distance) and non-
observable country-pair factors that determine bilateral trade. The reduced gravity equation we 
estimate becomes: 
tradeijt = b0 + b1GAFTAijt + xij + uit + vjt + eijt (1) 
 
In equation 1, the dependent variable is bilateral trade between exporter i and importer j in year t. 
The independent variables include GAFTA, t h e va r iab le  of in t er es t , an d  the t e r m s  xij , uit, and vjt, 
w h i c h  capture directional country-pair fixed effects as well as exporter- and importer-year fixed 
effects respectively.  
Trade data come from the World Trade Flows database obtained from the Center for International 
Data at UC Davis 8. The dataset includes both exports and imports and the advantage of this dataset is 
that it uses importer data where available. From this dataset, we choose a sample of seventy-five 
countries,  w h i c h  include the top seventy exporters and all fourteen Arab countries that originally 
signed the GAFTA (most of the Arab countries are in the group of top exporters). As we mention above, 
one of the shortcomings that this study addresses is including internal trade in the estimation process. 
Including internal trade is important because it allows for the possibility that international trade may 
come at the expense of internal trade (Bergstrand, Larch, and Yotov 2015). We construct internal trade 
values from world IO tables obtained from The EORA Global Supply Chain Database (see Lenzen et 
al. 2012 and Lenzen et al. 2013). Finally, data on RTAs are obtained from Mario Larch’s Regional 
Trade Agreements Database (Egger and Larch 2008). The trade data cover the period 1984-2016 but 
because IO tables are only available between 1990 and 2015, our estimation period becomes restricted to the 
years between 1990 and 2015.  
The PPML estimator is used to estimate equation 1. The PPML estimator has emerged as the 
workhorse estimator to model trade flows in the gravity context (Anderson, Larch, and Yotov 2015; 
Piermartini and Yotov 2016; Head and Mayer 2014)9. The results are presented in Table 1. The first four 
columns of the table present the results for the effects captured in 1998 - the first year of enforcement - using 
a continuous sample period (1990-2015) while the results in column (5) use 3-year intervals between 1990 and 
                                                            
8 The data can be downloaded from https://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/Html/WTF bilateral.html 
9 We use the STATA command ppmlhdfe to model trade flows, which allows us to use the PPML estimator with 
high dimensional fixed effects. 
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2015. In addition, the results in column (5) include two lags of the GAFTA dummy variable in order to account 
for the phasing out of tariffs that took place between 1998 and 2004 and following Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007). All standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level in all estimates.  
The results in column (1) suggest a positive and large average effect of GAFTA on bilateral members’ 
trade of around 62% (e0.484 − 1) in 1998 with the coefficient being statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. In column (2), we include a globalization trend by interacting a year trend with an 
indicator that takes the value of one for bilateral (non-internal) trade flows as in Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin 
(2019) and the estimated effect of GAFTA drops to around 40% (e0.346 – 1). Subsequently, we introduce 
two additional dummy variables, RTA and NAFTA in column (3). The RTA dummy variable stands for 
regional trade agreements and takes the value of one if there is a RTA between countries i and j in 
year t. Th e NAFTA variable takes the value of one if the exporter or importer is the United States, 
Canada, or Mexico from 1994. Including RTA and NAFTA allows us to compare the GAFTA effect to the 
average effects of NAFTA and other RTAs in the sample. It is important to note here that all three 
variables (GAFTA, NAFTA, and RTA) are coded to be mutually exclusive. This means that the RTA 
dummy indicates that there is a trade agreement between the two trading partner countries unless these 
countries are both either members of NAFTA or GAFTA. We estimate that the GAFTA effect in 1998 
(coefficient 0 .385) is larger than both the NAFTA (coefficient 0.226) and RTA (coefficient 0 .149) effects. 
In addition, following Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Bergstrand, Larch, and Yotov (2015), we include a 
lead term of the GAFTA dummy in column (4)  where the coefficient on the lead term should be 
statistically insignificant as a test for strict exogeneity,  and this is confirmed by the results. Fin a lly, in  
colum n  (5), we est im ate th at  GAFTA h as sign ifican t  lagged  effect s up  to 7 years followin g 
en forcem en t . Recall that , in  colum n  (5), we est im ate specificat ion  (1) with  3-year  in tervals an d  
in clude two lags of the GAFTA var iab le to cap tu re the gradual ph asin g ou t  of t a r iffs over  a  
per iod  of 7 year s. The tota l effect  is est im ated  to be aroun d  61% ((e0.222 – 1) + (e0.127 – 1) + (e0.196 
– 1)).  
The estimated effect of around 41% in the preferred estimation in column (2) is slightly larger than 
the 16-24% effect estimated for 1998 in Abedini and Péridy (2008). The estimated effect of 60% in 
column (5), which captures the phasing out of the tariffs, is also larger than the 35% effect estimated in 
Abdmoulah (2011) for the year 2008. This suggests that not accounting for internal trade and multilateral 
resistances, as we do in this study, may bias the estimates downward. We test the robustness of these 
results to estimating robust standard errors and including dyadic-trend terms and the results are 
qualitatively similar to the main results. These estimates can be obtained from the author upon request. 
With respect to magnitude, the average trade flow between Arab countries is 53 million USD in 1997, 
much lower than the average trade of 1.45 billion USD for all country pairs in the sample in 1997. Using 
the estimates in columns (2) a n d  ( 5 ) ,  this means that GAFTA leads to an average increase in bilateral 
trade flows between the Arab countries of around 22 million USD in 1998 and 32 million USD in 
2005. Hence, while the effects of GAFTA are substantial in relative terms, these effects remain modest 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    PPML      Glob.           Additional      with lead     with lags 
Trends         variable 
                            GAFTA 0.484*** 0.346*** 0.385*** 0.410***   0.222*** 
  (0.118) (0.115) (0.116) (0.159) (0.069) 
GAFTA (1st lag) 0.127** 
(0.059) 
GAFTA (2nd lag) 0.196** 
(0.098) 






Number of obs. 138,268 138,268 138,268 132,825 42,504 
Country pairs 5,318 5,318 5,318 5,313 5,313 




Table 1. Results from the PPML estimator for GAFTA. All regressions include exporter- and importer-
year fixed effects and bilateral directional country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
country-pair. Significance levels:* p < 0 .1; ** p < 0 .05; *** p < 0 .01. 
                           
3  Ge n e ral e qu ilibrium  e ffe cts  o f GAFTA 
 
To estimate the GE effects of GAFTA, we follow closely the method in Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin (2019). 
Obtaining the GE estimates involves solving a system of equations that starts with the theoretical gravity 
equation of international trade: 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖−𝜃𝜃𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝜃𝜃∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖−𝜃𝜃𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖                   (2) 
 
In equation 2, exports from country i to country j depend directly on Ai - the technology used in 
production in i , wi - wages paid in the origin country, and iceberg trade costs τij to send goods from i to 
j. These cost factors enter the equation relative to the cost factors of all other exporters to country j 
and that is accounted for by the summation term in the denominator. Goods are imperfect substitutes 
and trade elasticity θ is constant and bigger than one. 
Assuming labor is the only factor of production and imposing market clearing means that expenditure 
in country j can be written as: 
Ej = wj Lj + Dj, (3) 
 
where Lj is the labor force and Dj is an exogenous trade balance term. In GE, a country’s shipments 
across all destinations must add up to labor income (Yi = wiLi =Σj Xij ). As a result, using equations 2 
and 3, one can write country i’s total output or labor income as: 
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𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊 = ∑ 𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊−𝜽𝜽𝝉𝝉𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊−𝜽𝜽∑ 𝑨𝑨𝒌𝒌𝒘𝒘𝒌𝒌−𝜽𝜽𝝉𝝉𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊−𝜽𝜽𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊 (𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊 + 𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊)     (4) 
 
Let 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = �∑ Ak𝑤𝑤𝒌𝒌−𝜽𝜽𝝉𝝉𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊−𝜽𝜽𝒌𝒌 �−𝟏𝟏𝜽𝜽, which is the inward multilateral resistance term that was introduced in 
Anderson and Wincoop (2003) and stands for the effective price level in each country. The next step is to 
solve the system of equations represented by equation 4 in changes. If we denote changes with a ’hat’ (e.g. 𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖′/𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) and noting that ?̂?𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝜃𝜃 = 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽∗𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, we can write the equilibrium change in wages as10: 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖−𝜃𝜃 ∑ (𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖−𝜃𝜃 )(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖      (5) 
Once the change in wages in equation 5 is calculated, one can calculate the following GE changes in 
wages, real wages, and total trade volumes: 
 
 
GE wages effect: ŵi = Êi/P̂i (6) 
 
 
GE real wages effect: 𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊�𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖/𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖       (7) 
 
 
GE total exports effect: 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖−𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖−𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸�𝑖𝑖          (8) 
 
The above GE welfare equations can be easily solved in STATA using the ’ge gravity’ command 
(Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin 2019). This GE exercise is used to estimate the GE effects in 1998 and 2005 
separately to allow for the gradual full implementation of the GAFTA. This exercise requires defining 
a baseline, wh ich  is 1994 for a GAFTA effect in 1998 and 1997 for a GAFTA effect in 2005.  The 
choice of the baseline years follows the baseline PPML estimation, which precedes the counterfactual 
exercise, and which is done with intervals (see supplementary material in Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin 
2019). We choose 4-year intervals for the 1998 GAFTA GE effects estimation, and uneven intervals for 
the 2005 GAFTA GE effects estimation (1990, 1997, 2005, 2010 , 2015). We test the robustness of these 
estimates to the choice of baselines years below. This exercise a ls o  requires assuming a value of trade 
elasticity θ and we assume a value of four following Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin (2019). The exercise then 
calculates counterfactual trade and wage levels for the baseline given the GAFTA effect and the GE 
effects are consequently obtained by taking the difference between the baseline and the counterfactual 
scenarios.  The results from this exercise are presented in Table 2.  These results confirm that the 
welfare effect of GAFTA is very modest if not negligible. Generally, smaller economies benefit more 
than larger ones. In addition, the welfare effects are generally higher in 2005 compared to 1998. The 
highest welfare effects (real wages) are registered for Oman (0 .22%) and J ordan (0 .24%) in 2005. 
Similarly, the overall GE trade effects are very small and not always positive. The highest trade effects 
                                                            
10 The coefficient β is obtained from estimating the partial effect of an FTA on bilateral trade from a structural 
gravity equation: 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = exp�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . 
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are estimated for Iraq (0 .42%) and Syria (0 .25%). In some cases, the aggregate GE trade effects are 
negative which suggests that the diversion effects of GAFTA may be greater than the creation effects in 
some countries.  
The robustness of these results is further examined to assuming a value of the trade elasticity θ of 
seven, which is also used in the literature (Yotov et al. 2016). Table 4 in the appendix presents the 
results and shows that the results are qualitatively similar to the benchmark results in Table 2. We also 
test the robustness of the results to the choice of baseline years by taking the same baseline year (1996) 
for both the 1998 and 2005 GE estimations. This requires assuming 3-year intervals in the baseline 
PPML estimation in the case of the 1998 estimation and uneven intervals in the case of the 2005 
estimation (1990 , 1993, 1996, 2005, 2010 , 2015). The results are reported in Table 5 in the appendix. 
Here too, the results are qualitatively similar. 
The small GE effects of GAFTA estimated in this study echo the findings of the ex-ante CGE study 
of Konan (2003), which found that a pure GAFTA would have very small, albeit mixed effects in Tunisia 
and Egypt. The estimated small effects are likely to be the results of the lack of depth of the GAFTA 
agreement,  wh ich  does not go farther than removing tariffs among the member states. To put this in 
context, NAFTA, which is a much deeper trade agreement, has led to an increase in real consumption of 
3.8% in Mexico, 3.4% in Canada, and 0 .33% in the US (Larch and Yotov 2016). 
Taken together, the PE effects on bilateral trade and the GE effects on welfare suggest GAFTA has had 
limited success in bringing about real economic benefits to the member states. This is perhaps not 
surprising given the very limited scope of GAFTA as we discussed previously. In addition, the fact that the 
member states have been so far unsuccessful in negotiating a deeper RTA reflects the complicated political 
picture in the region especially following the Arab Spring. While usually lumped together as one club of 
countries, the club Arab countries is rather fragmented in terms of political and economic worldviews. The 
GCC countries, for example, are politically allied with the US and the West and have generally embraced 
globalization and the Western economic model. Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, on the other hand, belong to 
the Iranian-Russian camp. Other countries such as Tunisia, where the Arab Spring was arguably more 
successful in instating democracy, are still struggling to draw a future economic trajectory for themselves. 
Furthermore, civil conflict still rages in Libya, Syria, and Yemen with overwhelming international 
influence from countries with conflicting strategic interests. It is therefore not surprising the further 
integration is unlikely in the current political and economic climates. The shortcomings of GAFTA are 
comparable to the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). SAFTA includes countries with political and 
economic rivalries such as between India and Pakistan, and politically unstable countries such as 
Afghanistan. The diverging economic realities and strategic interests of the SAFTA countries have also 
lead to limited success in trade integration among the member countries (Weerakoon 2010). 
 
4  Co n clus io n  
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This paper examines the partial and general equilibrium effects of the Greater Arab Free Trade 
Agreement (GAFTA). In doing so, this study addresses the empirical shortcomings that occur in the 
limited number of existing studies that investigate the effects of GAFTA. This is also the first study 
that conducts a comprehensive ex-post analysis of the GE effects of GAFTA. The PE estimates suggest 
that GAFTA had a significant effect on the members’ bilateral trade flows but these effects may be small 
in absolute terms owning to the initial small trade flows between members. The GE effects paint a picture 
of the low effectiveness of GAFTA in bringing about substantial welfare and trade effects for the member 
states. This is in contrast with other RTAs that have proven to be more beneficial to their participants. 
These results highlight the need for deeper integration in the Arab countries to capitalize on the benefits 
of free trade. This is especially crucial after the Arab Spring has laid bare the chronic economic failures 
in the region. The literature points to the right direction. Deeper integration through deeper trade 
agreements is needed and a move towards further harmonization of procedures and standards can go 
a long way in this respect. Future research should investigate possible additional benefits to the Arab 






 1998   2005  
Exporter % d wages % d real wages % d trade % d wages % d real wages % d trade 
AGO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
ARE 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.045 0.045 0.049 
ARG 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
AUS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
AUT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
BEL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
BGD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
BHR 0.069 0.055 -0.089 0.039 0.040 0.069 
BRA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
CAN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CHE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
CHL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
CHN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
COL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
CRI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
CUB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
DEU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
DNK 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
DOM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DZA 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
ECU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EGY 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.022 0.021 -0.014 
ESP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
ETH 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 
FIN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
FRA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
GBR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
GHA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
GRC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
GTM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
HUN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
IDN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IND 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IRL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
IRN 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
IRQ 0.020 0.020 0.197 0.159 0.090 0.420 
ISR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
ITA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
JOR 0.030 0.032 0.010 0.215 0.219 0.024 
JPN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
KAZ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
KEN 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 
KOR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
KWT 0.013 0.013 -0.016 0.094 0.102 -0.095 
LBN 0.005 0.009 0.020 0.091 0.073 -0.095 
LBY 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.039 0.039 0.004 
LKA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
MAR 0.006 0.005 -0.015 0.040 0.038 -0.091 
MEX 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MMR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
MYS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
NGA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
NLD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
NOR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
NZL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OMN 0.034 0.036 -0.026 0.226 0.235 -0.088 
PAK 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
PAN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PER 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
PHL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
POL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
PRT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
QAT 0.020 0.019 0.007 0.018 0.018 -0.005 
ROM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SAU 0.005 0.005 0.015 0.021 0.017 0.063 
SWE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
SYR 0.005 0.006 0.015 0.083 0.079 0.249 
THA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
TUN 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.059 0.057 -0.024 
TUR 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
TWN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
URY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
USA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ZAF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 
Table 2. The GE welfare effects of GAFTA in 1998 and 2005. All numbers are in percentages. Trade 
elasticity is assumed to be four. 
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AGO CHE ECU HUN KAZ MYS POL TWN 
ARE CHL EGY IDN KEN NGA PRT URY 
ARG CHN ESP IND KOR NLD QAT USA 
AUS COL ETH IRL KWT NOR ROU VNM 
AUT CRI FIN IRN LBN NZL SAU ZAF 
BEL CUB FRA IRQ LBY OMN SWE  
BGD DEU GBR ISR LKA PAK SYR  
BHR DNK GHA ITA MAR PAN THA  
BRA DOM GRC JOR MEX PER TUN  
CAN DZA GTM JPN MMR PHL TUR  
 






 1998   2005  
Exporter % d wages % d real wages % d trade % d wages % d real wages % d trade 
AGO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ARE 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.026 0.026 0.030 
ARG 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
AUS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AUT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BEL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
BGD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BHR 0.039 0.030 -0.054 0.023 0.023 0.042 
BRA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CAN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CHE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
CHL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CHN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
COL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CRI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CUB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
DEU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
DNK 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
DOM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DZA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ECU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EGY 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.012 -0.008 
ESP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ETH 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 
FIN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
FRA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
GBR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
GHA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
GRC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
GTM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
HUN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
IDN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IND 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IRL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
IRN 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IRQ 0.012 0.011 0.118 0.092 0.052 0.246 
ISR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
ITA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
JOR 0.017 0.018 0.006 0.123 0.125 0.015 
JPN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
KAZ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
KEN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
KOR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
KWT 0.007 0.008 -0.010 0.053 0.058 -0.057 
LBN 0.003 0.005 0.013 0.052 0.041 -0.059 
LBY 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.022 0.022 0.003 
LKA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MAR 0.003 0.003 -0.009 0.022 0.021 -0.055 
MEX 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MMR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MYS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NGA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
NLD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
NOR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
NZL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OMN 0.019 0.020 -0.016 0.128 0.134 -0.052 
PAK 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PAN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PER 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PHL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
POL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
PRT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
QAT 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.010 0.010 -0.003 
ROM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SAU 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.038 
SWE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
SYR 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.048 0.046 0.149 
THA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TUN 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.033 0.033 -0.015 
TUR 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
TWN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
URY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
USA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ZAF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 
Table 4. The GE welfare effects of GAFTA in 1998 and 2005. All numbers are in percentages. Trade 





 1998   2005  
Exporter % d wages % d real wages % d trade % d wages % d real wages % d trade 
AGO 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ARE -0.044 -0.044 -0.019 0.008 0.008 0.003 
ARG 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AUS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AUT 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BEL 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BGD 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BHR -0.131 -0.134 -0.163 0.024 0.024 0.029 
BRA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CAN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CHE 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CHL 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CHN 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
COL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CRI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CUB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DEU 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DNK 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DOM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DZA 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ECU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EGY -0.015 -0.017 -0.021 0.003 0.003 0.004 
ESP 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ETH 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FIN 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FRA 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GBR 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GHA 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GRC 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GTM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HUN 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IDN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IND 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IRL 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IRN 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IRQ -0.001 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 -0.007 
ISR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ITA 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
JOR -0.069 -0.077 -0.062 0.013 0.014 0.011 
JPN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
KAZ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
KEN 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
KOR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
KWT -0.066 -0.070 0.075 0.012 0.013 -0.013 
LBN -0.045 -0.044 0.006 0.008 0.008 -0.001 
LBY -0.023 -0.022 -0.016 0.004 0.004 0.003 
LKA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MAR -0.027 -0.026 0.066 0.005 0.005 -0.012 
MEX 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MMR 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MYS 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NGA 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NLD 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NOR 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NZL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OMN -0.155 -0.162 0.097 0.028 0.029 -0.017 
PAK 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PAN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PER 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PHL 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
POL 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PRT 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
QAT -0.092 -0.091 -0.014 0.017 0.016 0.003 
ROM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SAU -0.025 -0.022 -0.054 0.004 0.004 0.010 
SWE 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SYR -0.048 -0.049 -0.124 0.009 0.009 0.022 
THA 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TUN -0.037 -0.037 0.012 0.007 0.007 -0.002 
TUR 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TWN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
URY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
USA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ZAF 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 5. The GE welfare effects of GAFTA in 1998 and 2005. All numbers are in percentages. Trade 
elasticity is assumed four. Baseline year for the counterfactual exercise is taken to be 1996 to estimate 
the effects in both years. 
 
